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PANEL DISCUSSION
Introduction
Professor Emerson's lecture on "Legal Foundations of the Right to
Know" keynoted a daylong symposium on the first amendment held
March 3, 1976, at Washington University. At a subsequent panel dis-
cussion several distinguished lawyers and members of the press responded
to Professor Emerson's address. The remarks of two panel members,
Professor Walter Gellhorn and Mr. James C. Goodale, are reprinted
below. Transcripts of their responses have been edited slightly for
publication.
THE RIGHT TO KNOW: FIRST AMENDMENT
OVERBREADTH?
WALTER GELLHORN*
Like other members of the panel, I regard the first amendment as
a safeguard against the tyranny of a possibly transient majority.
Majorities, although not necessarily malicious, pernicious, or vicious, do
tend to be persuaded that they are right and that those who disagree
are dangerously wrong. The first amendment is meant to protect
against the imposition of restraints upon disagreement, since a minority
view may ultimately gain acceptance and thus lead to a different
majority.
I disagree, however, with the suggestion that the first amendment
was intended to be, and should in fact be treated as, an absolute or
a near-absolute. Society does not choose merely between the "good"
of free speech or free press and the "evil" of suppression. Rather,
society is constantly selecting among competing values to establish its
principles governing communication.
Consider, for example, the issue of legally enforced confidentiality.
Confidentiality is widely regarded as a social value that sometimes out-
weighs the social value of unfettered communication. Most lawyers
believe that grand jury proceedings should not be publicized because
* University Professor Emeritus, Columbia University School of Law. A.B., 1927,
Amherst; LL.B., 1931, Columbia University.
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many damaging, though ultimately unsubstantiated, statements may be
made during a grand jury's investigation. Hence, if the grand jury does
not find persuasive evidence of wrongdoing and therefore does not
return an indictment, its confidential proceedings are not appropriate
subjects for newspaper stories. Lawyers also agree that clients should
be able to speak to their attorneys confidentially. Preserving the confi-
dentiality of the attorney-client relationship involves a social value. A
social, not personal, choice is made between the desirability of broad
communication and the need for restricted communication. Individuals
are the direct beneficiaries or objects of the choice, to be sure, but the
choice presumably reflects a belief that society as a whole, not
merely the immediately affected persons, will gain by restricting com-
munication.
When discussion turns to activities relating to the newspaper
business, however, some of my friends begin speaking as though no
choices are to be made, and as though every restraint is an assault on
the Constitution. Consider the "reporter's privilege" as a case in point.
Newspapers argue that a reporter should never, under any circum-
stances, be compelled to disclose the sources of his information,
because to do so would impede the gathering and publishing of infor-
mation that may be of public interest. No doubt a very good argument
can be made for extending to the reporter a nondisclosure privilege
analogous to the attorney-client privilege. But in the end a social
choice is made, and the first amendment does not dictate the outcome.
In short, many of the choices between unbridled and restricted
communication are not, in my estimation, fundamentally constitutional
choices. We mislead ourselves by presenting every problem that con-
fronts contemporary society as a justiciable issue to be decided by aloof
judges under the rubric of a constitutional principle. Furthermore, the
"right to know" principle is itself so broadly and vaguely phrased that
it cannot decide cases. Judges must still decide the cases. Recently,
a California court held that a state law prohibiting opticians and
optometrists from advertising prices for eyeglass frames was unconstitu-
tional. Mr. Emerson's paper refers to a similar case in Virginia con-
cerning the publication of prices for prescription drugs and pharmaceu-
ticals. Both courts reasoned that the state laws were unconstitutional
because the Constitution gives people the right to know, whereas the
challenged statutes constricted the dissemination of available factual in-
formation. This kind of judicial analysis strikes me as simplistic. The
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real issue is whether price advertising in connection with the rendering of
professional or semiprofessional services generates evils that outweigh the
benefits. The answer is not to be found in a slogan like "the right to
know" or "freedom of the press."'
The same is true of libel suits, which newspapermen denounce as
a discouragement to the press. Whether more or fewer libel suits
would be socially advantageous cannot be determined by considering
only the interest of the press. The possibility of recovery can be
reduced, as it has been in the case of public figures. At the same time,
protection for private individuals can be enlarged, if a social judgment
is made that individuals need to be safeguarded against defamatory
news reporting. The social judgment should relate to experience, to
knowledge of what is happening in society, rather than to a vague
phrase in the Constitution.
So also with "gag orders." Certainly an argument can be advanced
in favor of delaying dissemination of information of an extrajudicial na-
ture concerning a pending case. A gag order does not forever block
critical comment upon the prosecution or the judge. The crucial question
is whether, as rival newspapers seem to believe, the health of society is
furthered by the speediest possible news reporting.
I come finally to some absolute convictions, some propositions I
regard as not within the realm of choice. Equality is one such absolute.
Were I to recognize the power of any public organ to limit the dissemi-
nation of information, I would further say that limitations must be
imposed on an equal basis. For example, a municipality may choose to
prohibit mass demonstrations and political gatherings in a public
park, so that the park may be preserved for its intended recrea-
tional uses. But if political activities are forbidden, the prohibition
must extend to everyone and to all political activities. Principles of
equality, equally applied, are fundamental.
Secondly, the purpose of the first amendment is not, as some of my
journalist friends contend, to assure the early exposure of factual data.
Rather, the first amendment is meant to protect the expression of
opinion and of opposition to established views. I grant, of course, that
I. Shortly after these remarks were delivered, the Supreme Court found an an-
swer to the Virginia price advertising question in constitutional principles. Virginia
State 3d. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1817
(1976) (affirming that such restrictions violate the first amendment). The author, how-
ever, adheres to his belief that the analysis was simplistic.
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opinions may grow out of exposure of factual data. The special
concern of the first amendment, however, is freedom of debate, expres-
sion, and opinion. That kind of freedom is worthy of absolute protec-
tion; at any rate, circumstances in which it could appropriately be
restricted are not readily apparent.
My conclusion is that the first amendment is being overworked.
Some of the tough questions for which answers are being sought in con-
stitutional phrases should not be in the courts at all. Whether the right
to know should take precedence over other rights is not to be deter-
mined by dogma, but by hard thinking and debate in a proper forum.
The proper boundaries of the right to know cannot be fixed by recourse
to a single abstract principle. For instance, arguments advanced in
support of a reporter's privilege differ greatly, both in weight and in
content, from arguments concerning price advertising or gag orders.
The limitations must therefore be drawn episode by episode, with full
awareness of the competing values to be weighed.
[Vol. 1976:25
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1976/iss1/7
